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Abstract The Tagalog Ability / Involuntary Action (AIA) verbal form conveys
apparently unrelated modal meanings: that an action was within what an agent
could do or that it was beyond what an agent could control, for instance. Recent
analyses for the Malagasy and St’át’imcets counterparts of this form propose that this
morphology contributes circumstantial modality and conveys, roughly, that the event
that it describes follows from a set of facts (Davis, Matthewson & Rullmann 2009;
Paul, Ralalaoherivony & de Swart 2016). In Alonso-Ovalle & Hsieh forthcoming
we discuss some challenges for extending this type of analysis to Tagalog. Here,
we present an alternative proposal. We follow previous analyses in assuming that
the AIA form projects its domain of possibilities from a set of facts, but depart from
these analyses in proposing (i) that the modal component of the Tagalog AIA form
is non-at-issue and (ii) that it conveys, via a presupposition, that, given the facts that
the described event is assumed to causally depend on, this event was not expected.
Keywords: Tagalog, modality, actuality entailments, out-of-control morphology, implicative
verbs
1 Introduction
There are two classes of verbal forms in Tagalog: the neutral and the so-called
‘ability/involuntary action’ (AIA) form (Schachter & Otanes 1972; Dell 1983).
These forms contrast in their interpretation, as the pair of sentences in (1) shows.
The sentence in (1a), with its verb in the perfective aspect neutral form, conveys that
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Lisa opened the door. The sentence in (1b), with its verb in the perfective aspect AIA
form, does too. On top of that, (1b) makes an extra modal claim: that opening the
door was within what Lisa could do or that it was beyond what she could control,
depending on the context.1
(1) a. B<in>uks-an
<PFV.NTL>open-LV
ni
GEN
Lisa
Lisa
ang
NOM
pinto.
door
‘Lisa opened the door.’
b. Na-buks-an
PFV.AIA-open-LV
ni
GEN
Lisa
Lisa
ang
NOM
pinto.
door
‘Lisa managed to open the door. / Lisa accidentally opened the door.’
At first sight, the AIA form seems to lump together what look like unrelated modal
meanings. Why? Do the attested interpretations derive from one and the same core
meaning? What kind of modality does the AIA form express?
These questions are not new. They have been recently addressed and answered
in connection with similar verbal forms in other languages.2 The Tagalog AIA
form finds counterparts in the Malagasy verbal prefix maha- (Paul et al. 2016),
and, outside Austronesian, in the ‘Out-of-Control’ circumfix ka-...-a in St’át’imcets
(Davis et al. 2009), among others. Like the Tagalog AIA form, the Malagasy and
St’át’imcets forms can convey ability attributions or describe accidental actions, as
shown in (2) for Malagasy and in (3) for St’át’imcets.3
(2) a. Mahaongotra
AHA.pull-out
fantsika
nail
amin’
with
ny
DET
tanana
hand
Rabe.
Rabe
‘Rabe can pull out nails with his hands.’
b. Nahasotro
PST.AHA.drink
poizina
poison
izy.
3
‘He drank poison [by accident].’ (Paul et al. 2016)
1 Tagalog examples use the following abbreviations for glosses: AIA: Ability/Involuntary Action Form,
AV: Agent Voice, CV: Conveyance Voice, GEN: Genitive, IMPF: Imperfective, LK: Linker, LV: Locative
Voice, NEG: Negation, NOM: Nominative, NTL: Neutral Form, OBL: Oblique, PFV: Perfective,
PROS: Prospective, PV: Patient Voice, Q: Question Particle. Morpheme boundaries are indicated
following the Leipzig Glossing Conventions. Non-Tagalog examples follow the glosses used in the
source texts.
2 To our knowledge, there is no standard term used to refer to the Tagalog AIA forms and also to their
counterparts in other languages. Here, we will use ‘AIA’ to refer to Tagalog forms and, occasionally,
to its counterpart on other languages.
3 The parallel is not perfect, though. Unlike the Tagalog AIA forms, Paul et al. (2016) observe that
when maha- combines with stative predicates, it receives a causative interpretation that the Tagalog
AIA does not seem to have. Davis et al. (2009) also report a number of other interpretations of ka-...-a.
We discuss some of the differences in Alonso-Ovalle & Hsieh forthcoming.
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(3) a. ka-gwél-s=kan-a
OOC-burn-CAUS=1SG.SUBJ-OOC
‘I managed to get it lit.’
b. ka-gwél-s=kan-a
OOC-burn-CAUS=1SG.SUBJ-OOC
ta=ngúy’tten=a
DET=bed=EXIS
‘I accidentally set my bed on fire.’ (Davis et al. 2009)
Davis et al. (2009) and Paul et al. (2016) (for St’át’imcets and Malagasy, re-
spectively) have put forth semantic analyses of AIA forms that answer the questions
above. These analyses assume that the interpretation of AIA forms in Malagasy and
St’át’imcets derive from one and the same modal core. Although there are significant
differences in their implementation, these analyses propose, for the languages that
they study, that AIA forms contribute circumstantial modality; in particular, that they
convey that a certain outcome follows from a set of facts.4
In Alonso-Ovalle & Hsieh forthcoming we assess the extent to which this type of
approach can be extended to Tagalog by focusing on the interpretation of the Tagalog
AIA forms in the perfective aspect. We conclude there that there are differences in
the interpretation of AIA forms in Tagalog, Malagasy, and St’át’imcets, and that this
line of reasoning faces some challenges when extended to Tagalog. For reasons
of space, we will not reproduce here the main conclusions that we arrive at in that
paper, to which the interested reader is referred. Instead, we will present here an
alternative analysis of the Tagalog AIA form, one that partially follows previous
proposals about other AIA forms, but departs from them in several respects.
In Alonso-Ovalle & Hsieh forthcoming, we find no reason to challenge the
hypothesis that the type of modality that AIA forms contribute is sensitive to a set
of relevant circumstances or facts. Accordingly, our proposal in this paper follows
previous analyses in assuming that the Tagalog AIA form projects its domain of
possibilities from a set of facts. We depart from previous analyses, however, in
proposing (i) that the modal component of this form is non-at-issue, and (ii) that it
conveys, via presupposition, that, given the facts that the described event is assumed
to causally depend on, this event was not expected—rather than conveying that the
described event follows (or is expected to follow) from the relevant circumstances.
The paper is organized as follows. To make the paper self-contained, Section 2
repeats some background about the form of the Tagalog AIA morphology presented
in Alonso-Ovalle & Hsieh forthcoming, and introduces two properties of the inter-
pretation of the perfective form that guided our discussion in that paper. Section
3 presents our proposal: its basic components are introduced in Subsections 3.1
4 The analysis in Davis et al. 2009 was first presented in Davis, Matthewson & Rullmann 2007. In
what follows we will mainly refer to Davis et al. 2009, which is a longer version of Davis et al. 2007.
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Neutral AIA
AGENT b<um>ukas naka-bukas
PATIENT b<in>ukas* na-bukas*
LOCATIVE b<in>kus-an na-buks-an
CONVEYANCE i-b<in>ukas na-i-bukas
Table 1 Sample voice forms for the neutral and AIA forms of bukas ‘open’ in
the perfective (Forms marked * are slightly marginal)
Neutral AIA
PERFECTIVE b<in>uks-an na-buks-an
IMPERFECTIVE b<in>u∼buks-an na-bu∼buks-an
PROSPECTIVE bu∼buks-an ma-bu∼buks-an
(INFINITIVE) buks-an ma-buks-an
Table 2 Sample aspect forms for the neutral and AIA forms of bukas ‘open’ in
the locative voice
and 3.2, Subsection 3.3 illustrates how the proposal works in some of the scenarios
discussed in Section 2, and Subsection 3.4 comments on the non-at-issue status of
the modal component of AIA forms. Section 4 concludes with a brief summary and
an important question for further research.
2 The Tagalog AIA inflection: Form and interpretation
We start with some basic background about verbal forms in Tagalog.
As discussed in the introduction, Tagalog verbs can appear either in the neutral
or in the AIA form. Each of these forms inflect for voice and aspect: Table 1 shows
the neutral and AIA forms in the perfective aspect in different voices, and Table 2
the neutral and AIA versions of the locative voice in different aspects.
Voice marking correlates with the argument marked as the so-called ‘pivot’,
which bears nominative ang/si. This is shown, for AIA forms, in (4).
(4) a. Naka-bili
PFV.AV.AIA-buy
ang
NOM
bata
child
ng
GEN
mani.
peanut
‘The child {managed to buy / accidentally bought} peanuts.’
Agent Voice↔ Agent Pivot
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b. Na-bilh-an
PFV.AIA-buy-LV
ng
GEN
bata
child
ng
GEN
mani
peanut
ang
NOM
kapatid
sibling
niya.
3SG.GEN
‘The child {managed to buy / accidentally bought} peanuts for her sibling.’
Locative Voice↔ Location/Recipient Pivot
Aspect provides temporal orientation. Without overriding temporal modifiers, per-
fective, imperfective and prospective forms are interpreted as past, present/habitual,
and future, respectively, as (5) illustrates for the first two forms.5
(5) a. K<um>ain
<PFV.AV.NTL>eat
si
NOM
Junior
Junior
ng
GEN
gulay.
vegetables
‘Junior ate vegetables.’ Perfective form, past interpretation
b. K<um>a∼kain
IMPF.AV.NTL∼eat
si
NOM
Junior
Junior
ng
GEN
gulay.
vegetables
‘Junior {eats / is eating} vegetables.’
Imperfective form, present/habitual interpretation
We will focus here on the interpretation of AIA forms in the perfective aspect by
introducing two properties that set these forms apart from their neutral counterparts.
The first property is that AIA morphology restricts the possible contexts in which
the sentence that it occurs in can be felicitously uttered. To illustrate this, we will
make use of the following three scenarios:
(6) a. Scenario 1 (Expected Outcome). Lisa is trying to open an automatic door.
All that is required to open the door is to press a button. It’s impossible for
the door not to open if the button is pressed. Lisa presses the button. As
expected, the door opens. (inspired by Baglini & Francez 2016)
b. Scenario 2 (Ability / Overcoming an Obstacle). Lisa is trying to open an
automatic door locked with a numeric code. To open the door, you need to
enter the right code and press the open button. Lisa presses the button, but
she doesn’t know the code, so she tries different combinations of numbers.
She eventually enters the correct code, and the door opens.
c. Scenario 3 (Involuntary Action). Same door. Lisa presses the button. She
remembers the code but doesn’t have the intention to open it. She falls
over the keypad and enters the right code by chance. The door opens.
In all three scenarios in (6), Lisa opened the door. The perfective AIA sentence
in (1b), repeated below in (7a), conveys that Lisa opened the door, just like its
counterpart in the neutral form in (1a), repeated below in (7b), does. Yet, the AIA
5 See Schachter & Otanes 1972 for details.
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sentence in (7a) cannot be felicitously used to describe all three scenarios. It can be
felicitously used to describe Scenario 2, and, in that case, it is naturally paraphrased
with the English sentences Lisa managed to open the door or Lisa was able to open
the door. It can also be used to describe Scenario 3, where it is naturally paraphrased
with the English sentence Lisa accidentally opened the door. But (7a) cannot be
felicitously used to describe Scenario 1—to the extent that Lisa’s opening of the
door is taken to be completely predictable and expected, as intended. In contrast, the
neutral form sentence in (7b) can be felicitously used in all three scenarios—although
speakers can express a preference for (7a) in Scenarios 2 and 3.
(7) a. Na-buks-an
PFV.AIA-open-LV
ni
GEN
Lisa
Lisa
ang
NOM
pinto.
door
b. B<in>uks-an
<PFV.NTL>open-LV
ni
GEN
Lisa
Lisa
ang
NOM
pinto.
door
‘Lisa opened the door.’
Moving beyond this contextual restriction, Dell (1983) notes a second property
that characterizes AIA forms in the perfective in contrast with their neutral coun-
terparts: that they entail the actual culmination of the event described. The pair
of discourses in (8) illustrates this point. The discourse in (8a) feels contradictory.
The first sentence, with a verb in the AIA form, implies that the rock was pushed,
and therefore, that it moved. This implication contradicts the continuation, which
explicitly conveys that the rock did not move. Changing the verb in the first sentence
from the AIA form to the neutral form, as in (8b), turns the contradictory discourse
into a consistent one.6
(8) a. # Na-i-tulak
AIA.PFV-CV-push
ni
GEN
Ben
Ben
ang
NOM
bato,
rock
pero
but
hindi
NEG
ito
this
g<um>alaw
<AV.NTL.PFV>move
dahil
because
napaka-bigat
very-heavy
nito.
this.GEN
b. I-t<in>ulak
CV-<NTL.PFV>push
ni
GEN
Ben
Ben
ang
NOM
bato,
rock
pero
but
hindi
NEG
ito
this
g<um>alaw
<AV.NTL.PFV>move
dahil
because
napaka-bigat
very-heavy
nito.
this.GEN
‘Ben managed to push the rock, but it didn’t move because it was so
heavy.’ (after Dell 1983)
In Alonso-Ovalle & Hsieh forthcoming we noted that the actuality entailment of
positive AIA sentences in the perfective is reversed under negation. While positive
6 Non-culminating accomplishments are found in other languages, too. For an overview of this topic,
see Martin (forthcoming).
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AIA sentences convey the existence of a completed actual event of the type described
by the VP, their negative counterparts convey that there is no actual event of the type
described by the VP—rather than the weaker claim that there is no completed actual
event of the type described by the VP. To illustrate: while the positive version of (9)
conveys that Fe drew the red ball, the negative version conveys that she didn’t.
(9) (Hindi)
NEG
Na-bunot
PFV.AIA-pull(PV)
ni
GEN
Fe
Fe
ang
NOM
pula=ng
red=LK
bola.
ball
‘Fe drew / didn’t draw the red ball.’ (modified from Dell 1983)
To sum up, AIA forms in the perfective convey (i) a modal meaning component
that restricts the types of scenarios where they can be used felicitously, and (ii) an
actuality entailment that is reversed under negation. With respect to (i), we noted
that AIA forms can appropriately describe scenarios where a certain event obtained
despite what was likely to be the case, given the relevant circumstances, and that
they are incompatible with the description of completely expected outcomes.7
In the next section, we will present an analysis that aims to derive these two
properties. The basic idea is as follows. The actuality implications of AIA forms
are reminiscent of the behavior of implicative verbs (Karttunen 1971; Baglini &
Francez 2016) and invite exploring the possibility that the modal component of AIA
morphology is not at issue. This is what we will assume. We will take the modal
component to be contributed by a presupposition. Like in previous analyses, AIA
projects the possibilities that it ranges over from a set of facts. Unlike in previous
analyses, however, we will not assume that the AIA form requires the described event
to follow from those facts. Instead, we will propose that the AIA form presupposes
that, given the facts that the described event is assumed to causally depend on, this
event was not expected. This modal presupposition rules out inevitable processes
(which are completely expected, given the relevent circumstances) and is satisfied
in the scenarios where the meaning contribution of the AIA form is paraphrased
with the implicative verb manage to or the adverb accidentally. According to our
analysis, when its modal presupposition is satisfied, an unembedded sentence with
the verb in the perfective AIA form simply asserts that an event of the type expressed
by the VP took place. Embedding the sentence under negation is then predicted to
convey that this is not the case.
7 To our knowledge, the infelicity of AIA forms in contexts like Scenario 1 has not been explicitly
noted before.
81
Alonso-Ovalle and Hsieh
3 Proposal
3.1 Components
We will start by characterizing the modal component of AIA forms, which, as we
mentioned before, will be taken to be non-at-issue. To capture the modal component
of AIA forms, we will make use of two parameters of interpretation. We assume that
the modal contribution of AIA forms is sensitive to a set of facts (true propositions)
in the world of evaluation w and to a stereotypical ordering source that captures what
is expected in w.
We do not depart too much from previous proposals in this respect: we follow
both Paul et al. 2016 and Davis et al. 2009 in relativizing the interpretation of AIA
morphology to a set of facts in the world of evaluation, and Davis et al. 2009 in
resorting to a stereotypical ordering source.
We depart slightly from previous proposals, however, in making an extra as-
sumption about the facts that the interpretation of AIA is sensitive to: we will assume
that the facts that the interpretation of AIA forms requires considering are certain
properties of the world of evaluation that are causally relevant for whether not the
event that the AIA sentence describes happens. But we will not have much to say
about how these facts are determined; we will simply take causal dependencies to be
primitive and determined by a parameter of interpretation, a causal structure C .
A causal structure C for a set of worlds W represents causal relations between
variables, usually thought of as events or states (Thomason 2014; Schulz 2011;
Baglini & Francez 2016). In the Causal Premise Semantics presented in Kaufmann
2013, which we will follow here on this point, variables are modelled as partitions
of W (which we can intuitively think of as yes/no questions or issues).8 Given a
non-empty set of possible worlds W , a casual structure for W is a pair C = 〈U,<〉,
where U is a set of finite partitions on W and < is a directed acyclic graph over U
(Kaufmann 2013: p.1151)—a directed acyclic graph is a binary relation (‘variable1
directly depends causally on variable2’) whose transitive closure (‘variable1 depends
causally on variable 2’) is a strict (irreflexive) partial order. The graph in (10) provides
an illustration. The nodes in (10) represent variables and the arrows represent causal
dependencies—we get an arrow from one variable to another when the latter directly
depends causally on the former. Intuitively, what the causal structure in (10) conveys
is that whether or not the door opens depends on whether or not the button is pressed
and on whether or not the right code is entered.
8 Usually, causal networks express the probability that a certain event happens given the fact that
another event that it causally depends on happens. We follow Baglini & Francez 2016 (and Schulz
2011, which they borrow from) as well as Kaufmann 2013 in using deterministic causal backgrounds.
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(10) Illustration of a causal structure C (for a set of worlds W)
{b,¬b} {c,¬c}
{o,¬o}
b: ‘that the button is pressed’
c: ‘that the right code is entered’
o: ‘that the door opens’
We will keep in mind that causal structures represent causal dependencies at
a certain granularity level. Variables can be represented as being independent
even when at a more fine grained level they might depend on other variables, and
intermediate variables that are present at a certain fine grained level might be ignored
in less fine grained representations (Baglini & Francez 2016).
Given a causal structure C and a world w, we can collect in a set all propositions
in any of the variables in C that are true in w. This will be the set of causally relevant
facts in world w, which we will indicate in the graphs using boldface, as in (11),
where we represent the causally relevant facts in two worlds w0 and w1. We will
take the interpretation of AIA forms to be sensitive to a subset of these facts.
(11)
{b,¬b} {c,¬c}
{o,¬o}
{b,¬b} {c,¬c}
{o,¬o}
Causally relevant facts (given C ) Causally relevant facts (given C )
in w0 = {b,c,o} in w1 = {b,¬c,o}
We will assume that the interpretation of the perfective AIA forms conveys that
the existence of an event of the type described by the VP is expected in the world
of evaluation, given what the existence of this type of event is taken to causally
depend on. In order to express this, we need to make reference to what is expected
in the world of evaluation. We will then assume that the interpretation of the AIA
form involves a stereotypical ordering source S, which maps any world w to a
set of propositions that represent what is normal or most expected in w (Kratzer
1981, 1991, 2012). As we have mentioned before, because the unexpected happens,
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propositions in the ordering source can be false in the world of evaluation. Suppose,
for instance, that S yields for both w0 and w1 the singleton in (12). What is expected
in w0 is true in this possible world. What is expected in w1, in contrast, turns out to
be false.
(12) S(w0) = S(w1) = {λw. ow↔ (bw∧ cw)}
3.2 The modal component
Given a proposition p, a causal structure C , and a stereotypical ordering source
S, we can check whether in a world w, p is (in)consistent with the facts in w that
are causally relevant for whether p or ¬p is the case (as determined by the causal
dependencies in C ) and with what is expected in w (as determined by S(w)).
The recipe will be familiar. We take the set of causally relevant facts in w for
whether p or ¬p is the case, given C . This set will be the subset of the causally
relevant facts that contains any true proposition in any node dominating the variable
{p,¬p} in C . We then add to this set all propositions from the stereotypical ordering
source S(w), together with p. We then check whether the resulting set is consistent.9
If the resulting set is consistent, p is consistent with the expectations in w, given the
set of causally relevant facts for whether p or ¬p is the case—(at least) some of the
most expected worlds that share the causally relevant facts with w are p-worlds. If
the resulting set is inconsistent, none of the most expected worlds sharing with w the
causally relevant facts for whether p or ¬p is the case are p-worlds.10
We contend that the AIA form in the perfective presupposes that the occurrence
of an event of the type described by the VP in the world of evaluation w is not
consistent with what is expected in w and with the facts in w that the occurrence
of an event of that type is taken to causally depend on. We capture this as in (13),
where C→p,w names the set of causally relevant facts in w dominating {p,¬p} in C ,
and pVP names the proposition that maps any world w to true if there is at least an
event e of the type described by the VP in w (λw.∃eJVPKc(e)(w)).
(13) a. For any e,w, JAIA VPKc(e)(w) is defined iff
i. c makes available a causal structure C and a stereotypical ordering
source S and,
ii.C→pVP,w∪Sw∪{pVP} is an inconsistent set of propositions.
b. If defined, JAIA VPKc(e)(w) = 1 iff JVPKc(e)(w) = 1
9 A set of propositions is consistent if there is at least one world where all propositions in the set are
true.
10 We are assuming that stereotypical ordering sources are consistent.
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In (13), we assume that VPs express relations between events and worlds. We take
perfective aspect to map a relation R〈i,st〉—we will use type i for events—to the
proposition that is true in a world w iff R holds of at least a past event and w, as in
(14).11
(14) JPFVKc(R〈i,st〉)(w) = 1 iff ∃e[e< nowc & R(e)(w)=1]
We illustrate next the predictions of this setup in some representative scenarios.
3.3 Illustrations
Consider again Scenario 1 in (6a), repeated in (15) below:
(15) Scenario 1 (Expected Outcome). Lisa is trying to open an automatic door.
All that is required to open the door is to press a button. It’s impossible for
the door not to open if the button is pressed. Lisa presses the button. As
expected, the door opens. (inspired by Baglini & Francez 2016)
We noted in Section 2 that the sentence in (7a), repeated in (16) below, is deviant in
this scenario—to the extent that the opening of the door is taken to be completely
predictable and expected, as intended.
(16) # Na-buks-an
PFV.AIA-open-LV
ni
GEN
Lisa
Lisa
ang
NOM
pinto.
door
‘Lisa managed to open the door.’
Under plausible assumptions about the causal dependencies, facts, and expectations
that Scenario 1 makes available, the current setup captures the deviance of (16) as a
presupposition failure.
Consider, for instance, the causal structure in (17). Intuitively, what (17) conveys
is that whether or not the door opens depends on whether or not the right code is
entered and on whether or not the open button is pressed. Similarly, whether or not
the right code is entered depends on whether or not the agent remembers the code
and on whether or not she has the intention to enter the code. The propositional
letters in boldface type convey the causally relevant facts: according to the scenario,
Lisa remembers the code, has the intention to enter it, enters the right code, presses
the open button, and the door opens.
11 Note that, in this setup, the presupposition that AIA contributes has no temporal content. As far as we
can see, this still allows us to make the right predictions in the critical scenarios discussed in the next
subsections.
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(17)
{r,¬r} {i,¬i}
{c,¬c} {b,¬b}
{o,¬o}
b: ‘that the open button is pressed’
r: ‘that the agent remembers the code’
c: ‘that the right code is entered’
i: ‘that the agent intends to enter the code’
o: ‘that the door opens’
S(w0) =
{
λw.(rw∧ iw)↔ cw,
λw.(bw∧ cw)↔ ow
}
Let us assume, furthermore, as in (17), that the most expected worlds in the world
of evaluation w0 are worlds where the right code is entered if and only if the agent
remembers the code and has the intention to enter it, and where the door opens if
and only if the open button is pressed and the right code is entered.
Putting together the causally relevant facts in w0 that the opening of the door
depends on with the expectations in w0 and the proposition that the door opens gives
us the set of propositions in (18). The set is consistent. In fact, the proposition that
there is an event of the door opening follows from the causally relevant facts and the
expectations. The AIA sentence in (16) is then predicted to have a presupposition
failure.
(18) {b,c,r, i}∪{λw.(bw∧ cw)↔ ow,λw.(rw∧ iw)↔ cw}∪{o}
Let us now consider what happens when we interpret (16) in Scenario 2, pre-
sented in Section 2 and repeated in (19) below.
(19) Scenario 2 (Ability/Overcoming an Obstacle). Lisa is trying to open an
automatic door locked with a numeric code. To open the door, you need to
enter the right code and press the open button. Lisa presses the button and but
she doesn’t know the code, so she tries different combinations of numbers.
She eventually enters the correct code, and the door opens.
We noted in Section 2 that the AIA sentence in (16) can felicitously make a true
claim in this scenario. Under plausible assumptions about what kind of causal
dependencies, facts, and expectations the scenario makes available, this is expected.
Assume, for instance, that the relevant causal structure and expectations are the same
as in (17). The only difference lies in one of the contextually relevant facts: now
Lisa does not remember the right code, as shown in (20).
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(20)
{r,¬r} {i,¬i}
{c,¬c} {b,¬b}
{o,¬o}
b: ‘that the open button is pressed’
r: ‘that the agent remembers the code’
c: ‘that the right code is entered’
i: ‘that the agent intends to enter the code’
o: ‘that the door opens’
S(w0) =
{
λw.(rw∧ iw)↔ cw,
λw.(bw∧ cw)↔ ow
}
The relevant set of propositions is now (21), which differs from (18), only in
that it contains the proposition that Lisa does not remember the code, rather than
the proposition that she remembers the code. This difference has an important
consequence: the relevant set of propositions is now inconsistent. This means that
the presupposition triggered by AIA morphology will now be satisfied: the sentence
in (16) is no longer a presupposition failure and makes a true claim—that Lisa
opened the door.
(21) {b,c,¬r, i}∪{λw.(bw∧ cw)↔ ow,λw.(rw∧ iw)↔ cw}∪{o}
The context in (20) is one where the agent has the intention to bring about a
certain state of affairs and this state of affairs obtains in the absence of one of the
facts that is expected to obtain (remembering the code). In this context, (16) can be
naturally paraphrased with the help of the English implicative verb manage to. The
predicted modal presupposition is also satisfied in contexts where the relevant state
of affairs obtains despite the agent’s intention, and where 16 is naturally paraphrased
with the adverb accidentally. Consider, for instance, Scenario 3 in (6c), repeated
below:
(22) Scenario 3 (Involuntary Action). Same door. Lisa presses the button. She
remembers the code but doesn’t have the intention to open it. She fells over
the keypad and enters the right key by chance. The door opens.
The context in (22) is one where, again, (16) can be felicitously used to make a
true claim. This is expected under current assumptions. The reasoning that we
applied to capture what happens with Scenario 2 applies here in a completely parallel
way. Suppose that we evaluate (16) with respect to the same causal structure and
expectations. The causally relevant facts now include the fact that Lisa remembers
the code and the fact that she does not have the intention to enter the right code.
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(23)
{r,¬r} {i,¬i}
{c,¬c} {b,¬b}
{o,¬o}
b: ‘that the open button is pressed’
r: ‘that the agent remembers the code’
c: ‘that the right code is entered’
i: ‘that the agent intends to enter the code’
o: ‘that the door opens’
S(w0) =
{
λw.(rw∧ iw)↔ cw,
λw.(bw∧ cw)↔ ow
}
The set of relevant propositions, in (24), is, again, inconsistent. The AIA presup-
position is then satisfied in this scenario, and the claim that (16) makes—that Lisa
opened the door—is true.
(24) {b,c,r,¬i}∪{λw.(bw∧ cw)↔ ow,λw.(rw∧ iw)↔ cw}∪{o}
To sum up: the modal presupposition that AIA contributes is tailored to rule
out scenarios where the occurrence of an event of the type described by the VP is
consistent with the relevant facts and expectations, like Scenario 1, but to allow for
scenarios like Scenarios 2 and 3, where the facts that the occurrence of the described
event are taken to depend on are inconsistent with the expectations.
We conclude the presentation of the analysis with a few words about the nature
of the modal presupposition that our analysis assumes and its projection behavior.
3.4 A modal presupposition?
Under the current analysis, the modal presupposition that AIA forms contribute
imposes a weak contextual requirement. This is probably best seen through an
example: We have captured the deviance of our target sentence in (16), repeated in
(25) below, by making the assumption that the relevant causal structure looks like the
one in (17). But recall that causal structures commit us to a certain fine-grainedness
in the description of causal dependencies, and it is not difficult to add to (17) an
extra intermediate causal dependency whose expected value could fail. Suppose, for
instance, that we take (26) to be the relevant causal structure, where the opening of
the door is taken to depend on whether the right code is entered, the open button
is pressed, and, say, the electrical current of the internal mechanism is constant.
Suppose that we take the expectations in the world of evaluation to be as in (26),
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too. Assuming that the electrical current was not constant would make the relevant
set of propositions, in (27), inconsistent, and (26) to not be a presupposition failure.
(25) Na-buks-an
PFV.AIA-open-LV
ni
GEN
Lisa
Lisa
ang
NOM
pinto.
door
‘Lisa managed to open the door.’
(26)
{r,¬r} {i,¬i}
{c,¬c} {b,¬b}
{e,¬e}{o,¬o}
b: ‘that the open button is pressed’
r: ‘that the agent remembers the code’
c: ‘that the right code is entered’
i: ‘that the agent intends to enter the code’
o: ‘that the door opens’
e: ‘that the electrical current in the internal
circuit is constant’
S(w0)=
{
λw.(rw∧ iw)↔ cw,
λw.(bw∧ cw∧ ew)↔ o
}
(27) {b,c,r, i,¬e}∪{λw.(bw∧ cw∧ ew)↔ ow,λw.(rw∧ iw)↔ cw}∪{o}
Is the predicted contextual requirement too weak? We tend to think that this
is not the case. There are reasons to believe that the weakness of the contextual
requirement is a virtue, rather than a defect, of the analysis. The meaning contribution
of AIA forms is hard to pin down. It shines through in cases where speakers take
the described event to be completely automatic and predictable. Most of the time,
however, it is not completely impossible to rescue an AIA sentence by assuming
that an expected fact did not obtain, as represented in the last graph. The degree of
deviance of AIA sentences seems to correlate with the degree to which the described
event is taken to be completely predictable. The harder it is to construe the described
event as unpredictable, given what it is taken to causally depend on, the more deviant
AIA sentences seem to be perceived. And this seems to align well with the proposed
analysis.
We note, however, that the weakness of the contextual requirement that we
assume AIA forms convey makes it difficult to detect. This, in turn, makes its
projection behavior difficult to evaluate. We will wrap up with a few remarks about
this topic by considering what happens with the modal component when we embed
a perfective AIA form under negation or a question operator.
The behavior of the predicted modal component in negative sentences is consis-
tent with its expected projection behavior. Consider, for instance, the sentence in
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(28). If the modal component contributed by the AIA form is indeed a presupposition,
it is expected to project past negation: (28) should then require that it be taken for
granted that the opening of the door was not compatible with the relevant facts and
expectations, and, when this is true, to assert that Lisa did not open the door.
(28) Hindi
NEG
na-buks-an
PFV.AIA-open-LV
ni
GEN
Lisa
Lisa
ang
NOM
pinto.
door
‘Lisa did not manage to open the door.’
Consider the scenario below:
(29) Scenario 4. Lisa wants to open the automatic door, but she does not remember
the right code. She enters one by chance and presses the button. The door
does not open.
The sentence in (28) can be used to make a felicitous true claim in this scenario.
This is consistent with our expectations. Suppose that we assume, as before, the
causal structure and expectations in (30). Under this assumption, the relevant set of
propositions, in (31), is inconsistent: the predicted presupposition is then satisfied,
and the asserted content (that Lisa did not open the door) is true.
(30)
{r,¬r} {i,¬i}
{c,¬c} {b,¬b}
{o,¬o}
b: ‘that the open button is pressed’
r: ‘that the agent remembers the code’
c: ‘that the right code is entered’
i: ‘that the agent intends to enter the code’
o: ‘that the door opens’
S(w0) =
{
λw.(rw∧ iw)↔ cw,
λw.(bw∧ cw)↔ ow
}
(31) {¬r, i,¬c,b}∪{λw.(rw∧ iw)↔ cw,λw.(bw∧ cw)↔ ow}∪{o}
Now consider the scenario below:
(32) Scenario 5. Lisa wants to open the automatic door. She remembers the right
code. She enters the code and presses the button. The door does not open.
Under the familiar causal structure and expectations, the relevant set of propositions,
in (33), is consistent, so the predicted presupposition is not satisfied. The sentence
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is predicted to be a presupposition failure in this context. Is the prediction borne
out? What we see does not differ substantially from what we see with the positive
counterpart of (28) in Scenario 1. Whether or not (28) is taken to be deviant seems
to correlate with the extent to which the opening of the door is taken to be expected:
for (28) to be felicitous, it has to be assumed that some causally required fact did not
obtain.
(33) {r, i,c,b}∪{λw.(rw∧ iw)↔ cw,λw.(bw∧ cw)↔ ow}∪{o}
The behavior of AIA forms in questions also seems to be consistent with what
the analysis predicts. Consider one last scenario:
(34) Scenario 6. Ten contestants are each in front of an automatic door. To open
the door, they have to press a button and enter a code. Five of the contestants
were given the correct code. The rest were not. I don’t know who has the
correct code and who doesn’t. The contest takes place and every contestant
tries to open the door. I don’t see what the contestants did, but I see Lisa
standing next to her door, which is open.
The question in (35) is deviant in this scenario. This is expected, since it is not
established whether or not Lisa’s opening of the door was expected, under the
circumstances (it depends on whether Lisa knew the code.)
(35) # Na-buks-an
PFV.AIA-open-LV
ba
Q
ni
GEN
Lisa
Lisa
ang
NOM
pinto?
door
‘Did Lisa manage to open the door?’
Notice that the deviance of the question is expected even if we assumed that the
predicted presupposition is accommodated. Under that view, (35) would be asking
whether or not Lisa opened the door. But the speaker already knows that she did,
so asking the question in this context is predicted to be deviant. If the unexpected
component were at-issue content, (35) would roughly convey what the question in
(36) does. Since (36) would be an appropriate question to ask, the deviance of (35)
would not be expected.
(36) Did Lisa open the door and was the opening unexpected?
4 Conclusion and further steps
To sum up: in line with previous approaches to AIA forms in other languages (Davis
et al. 2009; Paul et al. 2016), the attested interpretations of the Tagalog AIA form
derive from a single modal core, which is anchored to a set of facts. Focusing on its
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perfective variants, we have proposed, departing from previous approaches to other
AIA forms, that the Tagalog AIA form contributes a non at issue modal meaning
component, which conveys that what is expected in w for the occurrence of an event
of the type described by the VP does not obtain in w.
The predicted semantic contribution of the AIA form is context sensitive: it hinges
on what the occurrence of an event of the type described by the VP is assumed to
depend on (at a given granularity level for causal dependencies) and on what the
expectations are. This—we have hypothesized—might explain why it is hard to
pinpoint the exact semantic contribution of this form.
To conclude, we highlight a limitation: The analysis presented in this paper
focuses on the perfective version of the AIA form, and it remains to be seen how the
predicted interpretation of this morphology interacts with the semantic contribution
of imperfective and prospective aspect.
AIA forms in the prospective aspect seem to convey future culmination and
a meaning component that can be paraphrased with English manage to, as (37a)
shows. The imperfective form is often used to express an ability attribution. In cases
like (37b), where the imperfective contributes a habitual interpretation, the AIA form
does not require the existence of an actual completed event of the type described by
the VP, but the AIA form can also be paraphrased with manage to.
Determining whether the proposed analysis predicts the behavior of AIA forms in
the prospective and imperfective requires investigating the semantic contribution of
the Tagalog aspectual inflection, an important task that we need to leave for further
research.
(37) a. Ma-i-tu∼tulak
AIA-CV-PROS∼push
ni
GEN
Ben
Ben
ang
NOM
bato,
rock
(# pero
but
hindi
NEG
ito
this
ga∼galaw
AV.NTL.PROS∼move
dahil
because
napaka-bigat
very-heavy
nito).
this.GEN
‘Ben will manage to push the rock, # but it won’t move because it is so
heavy.’
b. Na-i-tu∼tulak
AIA-CV-IMPF∼push
ni
GEN
Ben
Ben
ang
NOM
bato,
rock
pero
but
nagpa∼pahinga
AV.NTL.IMPF∼rest
siya
3SG.NOM
ngayon.
now
‘Ben manages to push the rock (whenever he tries), but he’s taking a rest
right now.’
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